This research provides an in-depth exploration into the policy processes that led to the introduction of tax breaks to build private hospitals in Ireland during 2001 and 2002 . It seeks to understand why and how the changes to the Finance Act were made even though they did not align with the health strategy's commitments and were contrary to advice from officials in the Department of Health, the Department of Finance and the Minister for Health.
While there is much written about increased privatisation of hospital care and blurring between public and private providers, there is little research on the policy processes and the policy choices that increase private provision (Maarse & Normand, 2009 ).
The aim of this paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of this specific policy making process in order to better understand health and public policy making processes. In particular, it seeks to understand the role of private sector interests in public policy processes.
Irish economic, political and health policy context Economic and political context. Between 1995 and 2005, Ireland experienced exceptional economic growth with annual growth rates between 5% and 10%% (Whelan, 2009) . Between 1995 and 2000, real GDP growth averaged 10% a year, way beyond growth rates in other European countries (Honohan, 2002) . This expansion, which was subsequently found to be unsustainable, was driven by a pro-cyclical economic policy, largely dependent on Foreign Direct Investment; and a property boom fuelled by government tax-reliefs and over-generous, unsound lending practices by banks. These factors, combined with low interest rates, which were predetermined by Ireland's Eurozone membership, fed 'an orgy of borrowing and consumption' (Kirby, 2010 : 4) .
Irish economic growth came to a sudden end in 2007/8, at the onset of the global financial crisis (Bergin et al., 2011) . By 2010, borrowing rates were unsustainable and Ireland entered an EU/IMF/ECB (European Central Bank) bailout (Department of Finance, 2010).
Two national political parties, Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats (PDs), were in power continually from 1997 to 2007 (Murphy, 2008 . Fianna Fáil, which was self-styled as the 'republican party', was the largest, oldest, dominant party in Ireland. 'At its most basic level, Fianna Fáil is nationalist -culturally, politically, and economically P 50 (Puirséil, 2017) . However, Fianna Fáil's ideology has always been 'ambiguous' with the party showing itself to have 'chameleon-like qualities in coalition' moving to the left while in coalition with the Labour party in the early 1990s and towards the PD's between the late 1990s and early 2000s P 67 (Puirséil, 2017) (O'Malley & McGraw, 2017) .
Popularly known as the PDs, the Progressive Democrats party, which was formed in the late 1980s by a group that split from
Amendments from Version 1
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Introduction
For fifteen years up to 2008, Ireland experienced exceptional economic growth and was regarded as a model for economic development (Bergin et al., 2011) . By 2010, Ireland was experiencing the worst economic decline of any high income country since the Second World War and was described by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as 'perhaps the most over-heated of all advanced economies' (Department of Finance, 2010) . Prior to 2007, Fianna Fáil, the dominant Irish political party, had been in power for 18 of the previous 20 years (Murphy, 2008) . Fianna Fáil is considered 'one of the most successful political organisations in twentieth-century Europe, consistently the largest party in Ireland, usually polling over 40% of the vote and occupying government for 62 of almost 80 years between 1932… and 2011 ' P1. (O'Malley & McGraw, 2017 . In 1992, Fianna Fáil's support dropped below 40% for the first time and they entered coalition with the Labour Party. From 1997 to 2007, Fianna Fáil, was in a coalition government with a small laissez-faire liberal partythe Progressive Democrats (Murphy, 2008) .
During this period of economic growth, Ireland's Department of Health developed a new national health strategy, which had 121 commitments, including a commitment to increase hospital bed provision by 3,000, the majority of which were planned for public hospitals (Department of Health, 2001) . In the year the strategy was published and the first year of its implementation, the Department of Finance established tax breaks for developers to build private-for-profit hospitals (Department of Finance, 2002) . Fianna Fáil, pursued economically liberal policies with a strong low-tax, pro-business and pro-market focus (Collins, 2005) . Although the minority party in government for ten years from 1997, they had considerable influence over government policy, especially economic policy (Leahy, 2009) . Their leader, Mary Harney, was Tánaiste (deputy prime minister) and from 2004 until 2010 she was the Minister for Health. In government, the PDs held considerable influence over health policy even before occupying the health ministry (Wren, 2003) .
The Minister for Finance from 1997 to 2004, Charlie McCreevy, was a senior Fianna Fáil member closely allied with the PDs and their leader. Fianna Fáil adopted the PD's position on many issues in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with 'little obvious difference in ideology between the two. This owed much to the personality of the Minister for Finance, who was a PD in all but name,… increasingly Fianna Fail became associated with the finance industry and developers' (Puirséil, 2017: 67) . Together, the PDs and the Charlie McCreevy had significant influence over Government policy (Collins, 2005; Leahy, 2009) . (Puirséil, 2017) Health policy context In 2001, a new health strategy 'Quality and Fairness' was published, which outlined 121 actions in a seven year reform programme (Department of Health, 2001 ). The Strategy proposed many measures, of which few were achieved, as most reform efforts went into restructuring the health system from eleven old health boards into one Health Service Executive in 2005 (Burke, 2009; Smith & Normand, 2011 ) .
During the 1990 and early 2000s, public hospitals were under increasing pressure to treat more public patients, to reduce waiting times as well as meet the demand for those with private health insurance (Department of Health, 2001 ). In 2000, there were limited numbers of beds in standalone, private for-profit hospital beds with some parts of the country without any private hospitals (Wren, 2003) . Research published in 2018 found that in the year 2000, there were 6,920 beds in 37 public hospitals, 6,116 beds in 34 private not-for-profit hospitals and 335 beds in four private for-profit hospitals (Mercille, 2018).
As public finances expanded significantly, the Irish public health budget quadrupled between 1997 and 2007, rising from €4 billion to €16 billion (Department of Health, 2010) . This rise reflected the economic growth and increased expenditure across spending departments, especially on wages. Analysis on the differences in health expenditure across 30 OCED countries in the early 2000s found that 90% related to GDP per capita (Department of Health, 2010 GNI (Brick et al., 2010) .
Research on the determinants of health expenditure has shown that there are three main factors which drive increases: 1) national income; 2) population age structure; and 3) institutional features of the health-care system (Propper, 2001) . The expert group which reported in 2010 found that these factors were applicable to Ireland at that time. Examination of trends in Irish public health expenditure, national income, population size and composition and prices reveals that the same associations are largely supported by Irish experience over the period 2000 -2009 (Department of Health, 2010 .
Much of this increased investment was making up for decades of under-spending, when Ireland spent well below the OECD average on health (Wren, 2003 While public current spending on health increased in the 1990s, there were few attempts to reform the financing or inequitable structure of the Irish health system (Department of Health, 2010). Ireland's inequitable and inefficient public private mix of healthcare is well documented, characterised particularly by the absence of a universal primary care system and inequality in access to the public hospital system, in that those who can afford to pay privately get preferential (quicker) access to public, as well as private, hospital beds (Burke, 2009; Department of Health, 2010; Tussing & Wren, 2005; Wren, 2003) .
Methods
As this research is concerned with what influences policy-making processes and the adoption of health policy choices at a national governmental level, the methodologies selected are qualitative. Qualitative methods allow the researcher to garner 'a rich texture' -a deeper understanding of the what, why and how of the policy processes (Walt et al., 2008) . They also allow the researcher to analyse and explain policy processes, as ' (Gilson et al., 2011: 2) .
The qualitative research methods used were detailed documentary analysis with topic-guided, semi-structured in-depth interviews with policy elites. These methods were chosen to allow a deep exploration of the influences on health policy (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) . The findings from these were then coded, recoded, distilled and analysed using the variables in the conceptual framework devised for this research and detailed below (see Table 1 ).
Documentary analysis
The following databases were searched for relevant documents:
○ EU Observatory on Health Systems and Policies; ○ Lenus: the Irish health repository; 
Actor power

Guiding institutions
the role of key institutions and their influence on the degree of priority given to the issue
The role of institutions in in 'politics as usual' situations (Grindle & Thomas, 1991) Actors in key institutions in the policy triangle (Walt & Gilson, 1994) The impact of institutions (Wilsford, 1994) Policy communities (Kingdon, 1995) The role of policy entrepreneurs the role and influence of policy entrepreneurs, particularly strong champions of the policy, in the policy-making process Policy elites (Grindle & Thomas, 1991) Actors in the policy triangle (Walt & Gilson, 1994) The policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995) Private sector interests the degree and influence of private-sector interests and lobbying
The role of private sector actors (Shiffman & Smith, 2007; Walt et al., 2008; Walt et al., 2008) 
Political contexts
Political ideology/ institutions
the degree that contextual (historical, economic and political) and political institutions influence the policy choice Political concerns of decision makers (Grindle & Thomas, 1991) Path-dependent sequence of political changes tied to previous decisions & institutions (Wilsford, 1994) Policy context including political, economic and social context (Walt & Gilson, 1994) The political stream (Kingdon, 1995) Political decision process (Shiffman & Smith, 2007) The importance of political context (Touhy, 1999) Policy process/ window the process through which the policy was made and the moment when the political, policy and problem streams comes together
The process through which issues get on the reform agenda and are pursued (Grindle & Thomas, 1991) The policy process (Walt & Gilson, 1994) How structures and conjuncture can interplay leading to significant policy change (Wilsford, 1994) The policy window and joining the streams (Kingdon, 1995 Interviewees were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality. Given the small size of Ireland and the policy making community, interviewees (IVs) are referred to by numbers, as saying they are a departmental official or a minister or an advisor could make them identifiable. One interviewee is identified in the text as he published a memoir subsequent to the interview where he retold what he had told in the interview and it is now in the public domain (Sheehan, 2013) .
Two key interviewees turned down the request for interview. In order to mitigate against bias, i.e. there is a probability that those who gave interviews were more favourable to the research, in instances where just one person or a small minority of people made a point, this is made clear in the analysis. Also triangulation of findings from the documents was used to support and verify points made by interviewees. In particular, documents obtained through FOI were used as these often stated the actual position rather than the official public or political position at the time. These were used as prompts in the interviews to validate or challenge points being made. (Walt et al., 2008) . According to Walt et al., Gilson et al. and John, policy making is not just about a decision but a process of the continued interaction of institutions, ideas and interests and these need to be taken into account in the conceptual framework (Gilson et al., 2011; John, 2012; Walt et al., 2008) .
In the absence of finding a specific conceptual framework suitable for this research, the authors devised their own from a very broad and deep search of the relevant literature in the public policy, health policy and political economy fields in order to help describe, understand and explain this particular policy process. It is hoped the framework will be useful to other policy analyses in the future.
Three main or overriding themes of 1) policy characteristics; 2) actor power and; 3) political contexts and the seven variables were derived from the following literature:
• Merilee Grindle and John Thomas -Public Choices and Policy Change -the political economy of reform in developing countries, 1991; (Grindle & Thomas, 1991) • Gill Walt and Lucy Gilson -Reforming the health sector in Developing Countries: The Central Role of Policy Analysis, 1994; (Walt & Gilson, 1994) • David Wilsford -Path Dependency, or Why History Makes It Difficult but Not Impossible to Reform Health Care Systems in a Big Way, 1994; (Wilsford, 2008) • John Kingdon -Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 1995; (Kingdon, 1995) • Caroline Touhy -Accidental Logistics, The Dynamics of Change in the Health Care Arena in the United States, Britain and Canada, 1999. (Touhy, 1999) • Actor power Variable 3 -guiding institutions. The key role played by institutions and actors in particular gained greater precedence through Walt and Gilson's policy triangle. David Wilsford's work on path dependency specifies how institutions can be central to maintain the status quo rather than bringing about change. Kingdon notes the need to pay attention to policy communities who have a key role to play in influencing the policy process. Grindle and Thomas identify how institutions play a key role during non-crisis, 'politics as usual' situations of policy change. 'Institutions' have a key influence on the extent to which an issue gains traction, becomes a priority and is actually addressed in public policy measures.
Variable 4 -the role of policy entrepreneurs. Kingdon's classic work on why policy issues rise onto and fall off governments' agendas, identified the problem, policy and political streams that come together at a certain moment in time to form a policy window, and this window is often opened by a policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995) . Kingdon defines 'policy entrepreneurs' as 'advocates who are willing to invest their resources -time, energy, reputation, money -to promote a position, in return for future gain' (Kingdon, 1995: 179) . Kingdon identifies how policy entrepreneurs are 'not only responsible for prompting important people to pay attention, but also for coupling both problems and solutions to politics ' (Kingdon, 1995: 18) . Kingdon also points out how there is no single formal or informal position for policy entrepreneurs, they can be a cabinet secretary, lobbyist, civil servant or academic.
While Walt and Gilson did not use the specific term policy entrepreneur, by putting actors at the centre of the policy triangle they are drawing attention to the role of individuals and the organisations in which they work, play in the policy process. Grindle and Thomas outlined the importance of the perception and behaviour of policy elites and 'how their actions can be understood as manoeuvring within constraints and opportunities created by context, circumstance and policy characteristics ' (Grindle & Thomas, 1991: 188) . (Wilsford, 1994: 252) .
Variable 7 -policy process/window of opportunity. Policy literature is as much concerned with the policy process that led to a particular policy's development and or its implementation as much or more than the actual policy content (Grindle and Thomas, Walt and Gilson). When Kingdon's three streams (problem, policy and political) come together, he describes this as the window of opportunity which creates a possibility for change. These do not come along too often as much policy change is incremental, but occasionally, often due to the political context as identified by Touhy and Wilsford, critical change can occur in 'windows of opportunity' or 'exceptional opportunity'. Grindle and Thomas focus on windows which occur often after a significant crisis or seismic event which often open these 'exceptional windows'.
Interdependency of the variables. While the three themes and seven variable emerging from the policy literature are independent in the conceptual framework, there is an explicit recognition that they are interrelated and often overlap. For example, actors and policy entrepreneurs are influenced by what policy is deemed a political priority and the economic, social and political context that they are operating within.
The conceptual framework developed for this research was devised by merging and combining aspects of the work referenced. All interviews were transcribed, coded, recoded and distilled using NVivo 9 under themes and variables identified in a conceptual framework specifically. NVivo allows the researcher to organise and classify data, to work through the data systematically so as to ensure a rigorous justification for the findings and an audit trial of analysis and findings (Bazeley, 2011) . All material was then analysed using this conceptual framework as outlined in Table 1 . Table 1 includes the original literature from where the variables were derived.
Results
This research sought to understand the policy making process behind the changes to the Finance Act in 2001 and 2002 that gave tax-reliefs to developers to build private hospitals. The results are outlined under the themes and variables identified in the conceptual framework, drawing on findings from the documentary analysis and interviews. However, often it is the interrelationships between the variables that are more interesting than the variables themselves. These issues are drawn out in the findings and discussion sections.
Policy characteristic Severity of problem. By 2000, there was widespread agreement inside and outside the health system that the shortage of public hospital beds and the associated long waits for public patients in emergency departments and for hospital admission for elective treatment was one of the major challenges facing the Irish health system (Department of Health, 2001 ). Since the 1990s, government policy stipulated that a maximum of 20% of patients treated in public hospitals can be private patients (Wren, 2003) . In 2002, after this policy was restated in Quality and Fairness, 25% of public hospital discharges were found to be private and in some hospitals up to 40-50% of patients were private (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2003) . This high demand for private treatment in public hospitals, combined with incentives, encouraged doctors and hospitals to prioritise private patients over public patients and exacerbated two-tier access to hospital care (Burke, 2009).
The main explanation given by interviewees for the shortage of public hospital beds was the failure to invest in the capital public health budget.
As specified earlier, Ireland's capital spending was higher than EU average between 1997 and 2002 but that was making up for 25 years of underspending on capital health infrastructure (Wren, 2004) . Interview data revealed the perception that if the public system was not going to invest sufficiently in building public hospital beds then tax breaks were a good way to incentives the private sector to do so.
the belief at the time was that we did not have enough beds… that we clearly were not going to be able to afford to provide them all through the public system (IV 5) Health and Children, 2001; Wren, 2003) .
In parallel, in 2000, the Department of Finance was developing the annual Finance Act, which is the primary legislation that brings the provision for the national budget into effect. The development of the Finance Act takes place behind closed doors. In the national budgets in the years up to 2001, there had been a proliferation of tax-reliefs, which gave tax breaks to developers to build hotels, houses, apartments, car parks, and shopping centres (Commission on Taxation, 2009).
Tax-reliefs were a central instrument of government policy, which fuelled the economy and a construction industry boom, which in turn generated huge tax revenues for successive governments. Tax-reliefs allow individuals or companies to pay less tax due to 'reliefs' (Department of Finance, 2011 These show that senior civil servants in both government departments and the Minister for Health's were opposed to the introduction of tax reliefs.
The role of policy entrepreneurs. Two policy entrepreneurs emerge clearly from the documents. In the first year that health institutions were included for tax-reliefs, James Sheehan, a surgeon and co-owner of Ireland's first stand-alone private hospital, lobbied finance minister McCreevy seeking tax reliefs for 'charitable' i.e. not-for-profit hospitals. Sheehan was at the time in the process of looking for investors in a private hospital he wanted to build in Galway. This was originally planned as not for profit but became a for-profit hospital in order to secure investment to get the Galway Clinic up and running (Sheehan, 2013) .
In November 2000, Sheehan wrote to the Finance Minister:
My reason for writing is to make representation to you in the hope that some tax incentives could be provided for acute [hospital] facilities (Sheehan, 2000) .
Communication between the finance and health departments at the time reflect this.
The Minister is under pressure from Jimmy Sheehan to concede tax incentives for his project (Department of Finance, 2000a).
This finding was verified by interview data:
A response from the Department of Finance specified 'the Minister is inclined to extend the tax-relief sought by Sheehan' (Department of Finance, 2000) . 
. (IV 17)
Every interviewee was asked about the extent of lobbying. All of the public sector interviewees acknowledged that lobbying took place at a political level. Politicians and/or political advisors interviewed concurred and in two instances specified times and dates that they lobbied which were verifiable through the documents obtained under Freedom of Information,
Political contexts
Political ideology/institutions. The senior partner in successive coalition governments, Fianna Fáil, was in power continuously from 1997 to 2011. Fianna Fáil, traditionally had a strong working class base; however, during its time in office, it shifted to the right as government economic policy was driven by the PDs (Leahy, 2009; Puirséil, 2017 
It goes back to that, to McCreevy (IV 9) Who drove it politically? I think the Minister for Finance would have driven it… I think he'd [McCreevy] justify it as an economic driver and just another area for development (IV 14) The rumour that was out of there, that…Charlie McCreevy, very pro-enterprise guy, pro-business, and that he readily drove in the [changes] (IV 17)
It was very much driven by McCreevy, as I see it you have to look back and assume that the Harney/McCreevy axis had a lot of influence at that time … I think they were socially very close and ideologically very close, both very dominant players at the cabinet table… (IV 18)
The role of the private sector emerged as a strong theme in the interviews.
The primary influence was a belief that the private sector needed to be involved to a much greater extent than they were in the provision of beds… therefore it made eminent sense to involve the private sector to the greatest extent, one way was to assist a private market by offering tax reliefs… (IV 5) There was a feeling about that the private sector can give you something far better, far more efficient and effective, better than the public sector, that's an argument that people have and that might have been a backdrop to it… (IV21).
Another finding emerging from the interviews was that the existing mix of public and private healthcare allowed for increasing private provision without any real public or political scrutiny of the development.
A mixed system since the last century… we have had private and public from the beginning and this allowed measures like the Finance Act to come in largely unopposed… At a senior level, the argument being: look at it you have the mixed care. The Finance Act did not create a new idea that basically you are going to have private hospitals -that debate did not take place (IV 21).
One of the clearest findings of this research is the political nature of the policy making process. In the case of the introduction of tax-reliefs to health, it was policy making outside of the health domain, which led to a large increase in the numbers of beds in private, for-profit hospitals.
Those things [changes to the Finance Acts] happened behind closed doors -there may be very last-minute consultations as to whether it was a good or bad idea. That would have been cloaked in smoke and mirrors as the Minister for Finance does not want the detail of what's going to be in the Finance Act talked about on the street. You hear about it in the run up to it, you'd hear the skeleton of what's going through and you could begin to think about it... But that would not have been unusual, that changes were just visited on the system overnight. (IV 1)
The Finance Act was primarily Finance driven (IV 21)
These 
And there were millions of hours spent consulting and looking at the evidence and then one or two things happen that can change it all… It is an abject lesson in policy making. At one level you have a very involved policy-making process with a huge amount of consultation, culminating in a health strategy, which had a very specific approach to one kind of action. And then that is up-ended by a Minister for Finance who can persuade his colleagues that the opposite or a conflicting approach is the way to go… I think it's an exceptional example of a conflict between the two. (IV 5).
Interviewees confirm what the documents show: that the tax breaks were driven by the Minister of Finance, McCreevy, and that health officials and the health minister had little success in their opposition. 
Discussion
The documents and interviews clearly show that the changes to the Finance Act in 2001 and 2002 which gave tax reliefs to build private hospitals were political decisions, made by the finance minister who was effectively lobbied by private hospital interests, who persuaded him to apply tax-reliefs to the health arena.
Even though there was an extensive national health policy developed at this time, with policy aims to increase hospital beds for public patients, mainly in the public hospital system, the wishes of the finance minister over rode the opposition of finance and health officials as well as the health minister.
This reflects findings in international health policy literature where economic policy goals usually over ride health policy aims (Kingdon, 1995; McIntyre et al., 2004) . The power struggle between the Departments of Health and Finance emerges clearly from this case-study. This is probably true for most elected governments, in that ultimately it is the Department of Finance that holds the purse strings and therefore the power.
A central finding in this research is the absence of good information eg no one actually knew how many people were waiting for hospital treatment in 2001. And throughout this period, there was no centralised information source on the numbers of hospital beds. In 2018, the first comprehensive set of figures on the numbers and types of hospital beds was published (Mercille, 2018) . This absence of good, or, in some circumstances, any information, is likely to have contributed to the lack of consensus on the causes of the problems and appropriate solutions.
Another key finding from this research is the absence of evidence used to develop the policy solution. Grindle and Thomas, Kingdon, and Shiffman & Smith each outline how having strong scientific evidence and a cost analysis of any policy proposal can strongly influence the policy-making process and adoption of a policy (Grindle & Thomas, 1991; Kingdon, 1995; Shiffman & Smith, 2007) . The findings are contrary to this: there is no evidence of any costings of the proposal in advance of the changes to the 2001 and 2002 Finance Acts. In fact, documents obtained through FOI for this research show that use of tax reliefs was contrary to the advice of both officials in the finance and health departments. This indicates little technical policy-making or analysis took place in advance of the political decision being made to adopt these changes to the Finance Acts. This is contrary to what is considered good practice in policy-making processes (Walt et al., 2008) . Analysis carried out for this research found that €150 million was given in tax reliefs to build private hospitals between 2002 and 2010 when these tax reliefs were discontinued following the recommendations of the Commission on Taxation.
Kingdon's research found that alternatives proposed by permanent civil servants were often selected over political proposals (Kingdon, 1995) . Again, this research finds to the contrary, that it was policies proposed by private sector interests and adopted by the finance minister which resulted in this policy change. The 'solution' that emerged was an alternative to public investment in public hospitals as proposed in the health strategy, a process largely driven by public servants. In turn, this failure to sufficiently invest in the public system provided the justification and adoption of private-sector solutions.
The Departments of Health and Finance emerge as central institutions in this policy-making process more for what they did not do, than what they did. Grindle and Thomas's work found well-intended officials who were capable of effective policy making (Grindle & Thomas, 1991) . These findings both support and contradict this. This research shows the officials in the Department of Health were well-intended; the documents and interviews show they pursued their work in what they perceived as in the public interest.
Contrary to some of Grindle and Thomas's findings, this research finds a disempowered Department of Health. It is impossible to generalise from this case but its examination draws attention to the non-implementation of the health strategy, which was the key policy document determining policy priorities for the Department of Health during the this time.
When it was put to an interviewees about how these two small changes to the Finance altered the landscape of hospital provisions, one response was as follows: 
it… you can't win them all (IV 21).
This demonstrates the juggling of priorities that health departments have to continually deal with and helps explain how some policy changes, even though they are not priorities get through without the support of the Minsiter or Department of Health.
This point was reiterated by other interviewees, that when the tax breaks for health were introduced, the health strategy was being developed, department officials had many other priorities and this was not even near to the top of their priority list.
This research reinforces the emphasis Walt and Gilson put on the importance of the role of actors (Walt & Gilson, 1994 and Walt et al., 2008) . Critical to each of the processes were senior political figures, while individual consultants and private hospital developers also held considerable influence.
Touhy's comparative work examining why change occurs in some places at particular time and does not in others, also identifies the critical role of actors in healthcare reform (Touhy, 1999) . In particular, she singles out the role of the medical professions and concludes that 'few areas are as strongly marked by the influence of professional actors and collegial instruments as in healthcare' (Touhy, 1999: 267) . One of the policy entrepreneurs identified was a medical consultant and co-owner of a private hospital, the other the owner of a private hospital and representative of private hospitals, many of which have significant investment from medical consultants.
In Kingdon's work, the policy entrepreneur is critical to opening up the policy window. He uses the analogy of them being like surfers, who lie in wait for the wave to come along. This seems apt for this research. Shiffman & Smith use a similar concept, albeit with different titles (Shiffman & Smith, 2007) . They describe the powerful role that 'political entrepreneurs' can play in influencing an issue becoming a political priority. The policy entrepreneurs identified in this research were strategic and opportunistic in the moments they choose to 'ride the wave'. Each was successful in that they secured two small changes to the Finance Acts, which significantly altered the hospital landscape evident in the large increase in private for-profit hospital beds (Mercille, 2018).
Grindle and Thomas's research found that policy elites were good at getting their issue on the policy agenda (Grindle & Thomas, 1991) . This was the experience in this case. They and Kingdon identify that policy entrepreneurs often come from positions of power; this too was a finding in this research.
Walt et al., and Grindle and Thomas, found that access to senior politicians by elites is more likely to happen in small, often post-colonial, countries where powerful vested interests such as consultants and private hospital owners have easy access to senior politicians; in countries which 'generally have structural roots in the colonial past' (Grindle & Thomas, 1991: 51) .
This was also found in this research and suggests that further research is needed on this matter in an Irish context. Is this privileged access just typical of young, post-colonial countries or is it true of other countries too?
Kingdon's extensive research in the USA found that changes in government, organised political interests, a shift in the national mood and the ideological make up of a government are important influences on policy-making processes and choices (Kingdon, 1995) . This research clearly found the ideological make up of the government was an essential factor in influencing these policy processes (Kirby, 2010; Kitchin et al., 2012) . The continuity of the government in power from 1997 to 2007 was the factor in this case rather than government change.
Grindle and Thomas also found that policy choices can vary depending on whether it was a time of crisis or not ie just 'politics as usual'. Economically or politically, the years 2000-2002 in Ireland was not a time of crisis. Ireland was experiencing unparalleled economic growth and was stable politically, with the same government in power for nearly 14 years. However, it could be argued that the public health system was in crisis and that the failure to effectively reform the public system created the opportunities for private for-profit health sector. They also found that political pressures can alter policies (Grindle & Thomas, 1991) . This was confirmed by the findings in this research.
Research trying to explain the policy decisions that led to the Irish economic crisis, refers to Ireland's policy environment as one of 'emergent neo-liberalism', where 'much of policy transformations of the Celtic Tiger era movements were, then, to an extent the outcome of a certain political pragmatism -doing what was necessary at the time to satisfy the needs of various sectors of the voting public -rather than being characterised by clearly delineated periods of 'roll back' and 'roll out' neoliberalism ' (Kitchin et al., 2012) .
Political ideology emerges, generally and in this study, as one of the strongest influences on the policy processes, in health as in other policy arenas. In this case, political ideology was served by the political institutions, in pursuit of a particular economic policy pursued by finance minister, McCreevy, and actively supported by the Deputy Prime Minister, Harney. The Deputy Prime Minister was the leader of the smaller coalition party which had disproportionate influence over government policy. This was enabled by close relationship between McCreevy and Harney whose ideology and policies were in line with the junior coalition partner. This emerged as one of the stronger findings in this research.
Touhy's work found that episodes of health policy change were brought about by windows of opportunity created by events in the broader political arena, not in healthcare per se (Touhy, 1999) . She found that when governments had a majority, which 'were swept into power by broad current opinion, that establishes the broad outlines for change ' (Touhy, 1999: 114) . Touhy concluded that it was these 'accidental logics that drive the dynamics of change' (Touhy, 1999: 239) . This resonates strongly with the findings in this research, in that these policies were born out of the political ideology of the time, which drove a specific economic policy agenda that included tax breaks, not out of any analysis of their potential effects on health policy.
Touhy also emphasises the importance of national context, in which the legacy of past policy failures condition policy makers to adopt an incremental approach which can sow the seeds of future policy failures (1999) . This emerged as a finding from the interviews, in that the existence of Ireland's unique publicprivate mix of healthcare allowed the justification of adding more layers to it with the introduction of tax-reliefs to build private hospitals.
This finding bears out the work of David Wilsford and others on 'path dependency' (Wilsford, 1994) . 'Path dependency' is a term used when a set of decisions for any given circumstance is limited by the decisions made in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. For Wilsford, 'a path dependent sequence of political changes is one that is tied to previous decisions and existing institutions ' (Wilsford, 1994: 252) .
Wilsford sought to explain policy change by seeking to explain a path-dependent model where 'actors are hemmed in by existing institutions and structures that channel them along established policy paths ' (Wilsford, 1994: 251) . When path dependency is influencing health policy reform, structural forces dominate and therefore major change is unlikely and policy development is more likely to be incremental (Wilsford, 1994) . The vast majority of change in Ireland's health policy occurred in an incremental manner (Burke, 2009; Wren, 2003) . Wilsford's work and others that draw on his work, is very relevant to this research as Ireland's historical public private mix in healthcare combined with the broad use of tax reliefs in other sectors laid the ground work and influenced the application of tax-reliefs to the health sector.
Touhy's work found that 'windows of opportunity' were created by external factors in the political system which may occur by accident of their timing. Between these policy windows, Touhy found health systems were shaped by their own internal logics and that 'across all systems, big reform is not the norm; it is usually quite difficult although not impossible' (Touhy, 1999: 113) . According to Touhy, a 'focus on "windows of opportunity" provides an explanation of how, under extraordinary circumstances, policy legacies are established and particular policy paths are embarked upon' (Touhy, 1999: 123) .
Reflections on the conceptual framework and methods The conceptual framework devised for this research drew on key health and public policy texts. While three themes and seven separate variables were identified, central to the framework was the interrelatedness of the variables. The findings from the documents and the interviews were then coded, recoded, distilled and analysed through the framework.
In some places, data were double or treble coded e.g. the justification for using the private sector to address the long waiting times for public patients was coded in 'ideas for intervention', 'political ideology' and 'private sector interests'. If unsure where best to code/recode/distil them, this was discussed by the lead author with the co-authors and a judgement was made as to where best to use the data. The coding, recoding and distilling of the rich data gathered allowed not just for a description of the policy process but an in-depth analysis as to why this policy choice was made and who and what influenced the policy process under the seven variables.
The inclusion of the 'policy window' in my conceptual framework allowed the authors to gain more insight and to utilise the interview content to explore the policy process. Examination of the policy window revealed unknown or unreported aspects of this policy making process. It found that the Minister for Finance, who was lobbied by a private hospital developer, then invited him into the department to assist with drafting the relevant sections of the act, which gave tax reliefs to build private not for-profit hospitals. The following year, after more lobbying the Act was changed to reduce the hospital size and include for-profit hospitals.
The 'policy windows/process' variable reinforces the importance of examination of the interaction of interests, ideas and institutions, an analytical paradigm that integrates political, processes and power as originally proposed by Walt & Gilson (1994) and later developed (Gilson & Raphaely, 2008) . The findings also support the literature which advocates the study of policy should be as much about what was not done as much as what is done (Gilson et al., 2011; John, 2012; Walt et al., 2008) , as well as identifying the perverse and unintended consequences of policy decisions.
The conceptual framework devised for this research provided a useful tool through which to organise and analyse the material garnered from the interviews and the documents. This research reiterates recent calls for rigorous research into and analysis of health policy making (Gilson et al., 2011; Walt et al., 2008) . With clear methods and a firm theoretical grounding, there is much scope for further theoretical and empirical work.
The use of documentary analysis and key informant elite interviews was appropriate for this type of research, producing large volumes of rich data. The use of Freedom of Information requests added greatly to the data gathered as they revealed what was going on behind the scenes in the Department of Health and the Department of Finance, which was not evident in the publicly available documentation. This documentation allowed the researcher to verify or challenge findings in the interviews.
Conclusions
The introduction of tax-reliefs in Ireland for private hospitals in 2001 and 2002 is a clear example of a politically driven economic policy, which came from outside of the health arena and had a significant impact on healthcare provision. Even though there was a much larger, health policy development process, the zeal of the finance minister for tax-reliefs for health over-rode the opposition of his own officials, the health minister and department officials.
The research finds that a small number of people involved in private hospitals lobbied the Minister for Finance for the changes to be introduced. This demonstrates politicised and personalised nature of these policy-making processes, in particular the power of the private sector in influencing the policy choice.
Data availability
There were two main sources of data for this research article -documents and interviews. The documents are listed in Supplementary File 2. It is not possible to provide the transcripts of interviews, given the nature of the interviews -interviewees were given guarantee of complete confidentiality and anonymity in their informed consent forms, it is not possible to provide them as source data. Their availability, even if anonymised, would break the agreements with interviewees and the approval
Introduction
The significance of the quadrupling of the heath budget in a decade is hugely significant. The expansion opens up new actors and policy options; taken-for-granted assumptions about finance and service delivery may no longer apply as strongly. The authors could delve into this further, drawing on documentary and/or interview data more clearly.
Methods
The issue of anonymity is described well although this does present some uncertainty in terms of corroboration. The authors do offer some data triangulation. Given the elapsed time between the period in question and this publication, it is important that the authors add the year/date of interviews to provide temporal context. There is a danger of recall bias and post-hoc rationalisation.
Conceptual framework
The authors draw on a reasonably wide selection of concepts for an article of this length. It shows that the article is drawn from a broader study. A narrower focus would provide greater conceptual clarity. It is hard to trace how the framework (used by the authors) was devised since Kingdon's model is one of two outlined on page 4, and yet the authors state "this research does not utilise Kingdon's multiple streams" but "Kingdon's concepts of policy windows and policy entrepreneurs are explicitly utilised in the framework." In my opinion, Kingdon's (entire) model would indeed be suitable for this study. In any case, citation of other studies (which used Kingdon's or Touhy's approaches) would be merited.
Findings
• more evidence from interviews/documents could have been provided to substantiate the Severity:
• more evidence from interviews/documents could have been provided to substantiate the Severity: claims being made. In particular, evidence from sources outside political/policy networks (eg. media reports, public opinion) would be highly relevant (given Touhy's argument). The percentage of population with PHI appears significant given growth of hospital beds in this sector seems to have been seen as a viable option.
• the feasibility of increasing bed numbers by 3,000 (including 650 in one year) does not Intervention: seem to have been addressed. Although the implications of the proliferation of tax breaks in other areas of the economy/society (including health care) were apparent, it was not clear how a consensus about application of tax breaks to health care was achieved. More detailed would be required, for example (eg. para.1, page 6 "They were a politically acceptable alternative to public sector investment"). This would include a comparison of how alternatives (drawn from Kingdon's `primeval soup') were considered and apparently rejected.
• this section provides a good sense of the policy process and change over time. The Actor power: authors note the potential imbalance between anonymised and named sources. Although this gives a somewhat tendentious perspective, it is transparent. I have an equivocal view of the table on page 7 regarding the role of policy entrepreneur; it is overly simplistic but it does address the elements of the framework. The article does point towards the inter-connections between elements but needs to be elaborated better (ideally in a longer assessment) to gain a thorough assessment of the data and the application of the conceptual framework to the data.
Discussion
This section does cover new and intriguing perspectives on `Accidental logics' and `Path dependency.' These could have been described better at the outset and then a more nuanced assessment offered in the Discussion section. Equally, the Discussion does not address Kingdon's multiple streams.
Overall, the article attempts to trace the process relating to a significant change in policy (between espoused policy and actual implementation). Whilst the conceptual and empirical sections offer interesting and relevant material, I feel that the article is under-developed in the sense of substantial contributions to theoretical perspectives. Some of the empirical data are cursory and more depth could have been provided. The interpretation of the data in relation theoretical framework needs further development. Much of this comment might be due to the nature/structure of the article (eg. Word length); in which case, I would suggest a more focused remit of the article, drawing on one aspect of the conceptual framework and exploring the relevant data associated with it. GN'I (P 65, (Brick A 2010) 22% and 0.49% of GDP (OECD 2017) .
Methods
1.
Methods
The year/dates of the interviews and greater clarification on how material was verified are now provided.
Conceptual framework
As the reviewer has correctly identified, this paper came from a broader study -the PhD of the lead author. As detailed in the overall response to reviewers, there is now much more detail on the literature drawn on, including a new text in the conceptual framework section explaining the rationale and literature from where each of the variables was derived. This is specified in a more developed table and in the text in longer methods, findings and discussion sections.
Findings
More quotes are added as suggested to substantiate points made. Other sources not originally analysed in the research are not used. Intervention: The points made here have been clarified in the body of the text. The research found that while there was political support for tax breaks in general, there was no consensus on their introduction into Health. In fact, it was the result of private sector lobbying, together with the positive response by the Minister for Finance to the lobbying at the time that brought about the policy change. Actor Power: The table of quotes has been discarded as a table and these and other quotes are now provided throughout the text. The interconnections between the elements are dealt with in the discussion section where they are now weaved into the relevant literature and in a new section entitled 'Reflections on the conceptual framework and methods'. Discussion: These issues are now addressed in a longer text in particular in the new section on conceptual framework Page ? , an extended findings (Page ? -?) and discussion sections (Page ? -?) with some sections largely rewritten.
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Eoin O'Malley
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland This is an interesting paper, that could be much more convincing if it were revised to take account of what I see as a number of problems.
This could be set up better. It is not clear, except for the innuendo, that the policy was necessarily 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
This could be set up better. It is not clear, except for the innuendo, that the policy was necessarily bad. I think the paper would be improved if it didn't try to assess the policy, and instead looked at how the policy was made, and what explains the policy choice. It is asserted that the chosen policy went against the Department of Health strategy -this is the key to the framing of the paper -but I think it would be more convincing if we could see that strategy, and show this more clearly.
There are also some problems with the argument. There had been the quadrupling of the budget when the 'neo-liberal' agenda was in place, this hardly suggests libertarian ideology at the centre of the government. It might be more interesting to look at why this was concentrated on current spending and not capital spending.
There is not a strong basis for the analysis in the literature cited. The empirical evidence appears to point to interest-based politics, and or ideology. The multiple streams framework doesn't really add anything. There is a literature, I'm working on, that looks at policy failures as a result of institutions (which can incorportate path dependency), interests and ideology. It seeks to explain how these interact to reduce/ target the flow of information to policy makers. I can see how this would add to the explanation here. As it is written, there are assertions made in the Discussion that don't really stand up to scrutiny, or at least aren't well supported in the text, f.i. there's nothing here that suggests that path depdendency is important. That doesn't mean it is not, just that the case hasn't been made.
There was no discussion of how Finance Bills are produced and negotiated. This would be useful.
The empirical evidence is dealt with in a somewhat patchy manner. The most damning bit of evidence evidence seems to be the claim that James Sheehan wrote the relevant section of the Finance Bill. Is this true? I'd be disinclined to believe everyone's claims. I'd prefer if the authors used process tracing techniques -it would make the paper much longer, but more convincing.
Other small stuff. There are no page numbers for references that are clearly page specific. Some references are to edited books, not the individual chapter that claim is drawn from, e.g. Gallagher and Marsh 2007. There is a reliance on the analysis of Kirby (2010) that is highly contestable, and hardly mainstream. he for instance does not recognise the genuine (and verifiable) increase in wealth, welfare and well-being associated with the Celtic Tiger years. On p.3 there is a misuse of the word conservative.. the authors mean liberal. Typo on top of p. 4, public patients? The methods section read a bit like an MA thesis. Claim on p. 5 that public patients do not have access to private hospitals is not strictly true, and they did through the national treatment Purchase Fund.
Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature? Partly
Is the study design appropriate and is the work technically sound? Partly
Are sufficient details of methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others? No
If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate? Not applicable
Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
